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Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to U.CA. § 78-2a-3 (2)(a), and LLC. A.
§ 35A-4-508 (8)(a).
Issues Presented
1.

Did the Board err when it determined that Petitioner did not make an

adequate work search and was thus unavailable for work, since the findings are not
supported by substantial evidence in the record?
Standard of review: Substantial evidence must exist for sustaining previously found facts,
based upon a review of the whole record. Grace Drilling Co. v. Bd. of Review of the
Indus. Comm 'n of Utah, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
2.

Is the Board's conclusion that Petitioner would not leave school to return to

full-time work arbitrary and capricious because it is not reasonable in light of Petitioner's
financial considerations and family needs?
Standard of review: Claims that an agency action was arbitrary and capricious reviewed
for reasonableness. Bourgeous v. Dep't of Commerce, 41 P.3d 461 (Utah Ct. App. 2002).
3.

Is the denial of benefits inconsistent with the purpose and policy goals of

the Employment Security Act (U.CA. § 35A-4-101 et seq.)?
Standard of review: Application by Board of Review of its factual findings to law will
not be disturbed unless determination exceeds bounds of reasonableness and rationality.
Dep't ofAir Force v. Dep't of Employment Sec, 786 P.2d 1361 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
4.

Has the agency erred under U.CA. § 63-46b-16(4) (h)(iii) since Petitioner

had previously been allowed benefits while attending school, and the Board failed to
1

justify the inconsistency?
Standard of review: Claims that an agency decision is contrary to the agency's prior
practice are reviewed to determine if an inconsistency is justified by a fair and rational
basis. Road Runner Oil, Inc. v. Bd. of Oil, Gas and Min., Dep't of Natural Res., 76 P.3d
692 (Utah Ct. App. 2003).
Determinative Statutes
U.C.A. §35A-4-102:
As a guide to the interpretation and application of this chapter, the public policy of
this state is declared to be as follows: Economic insecurity due to unemployment
is a serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the people of this state.
Unemployment is therefore a subject of general interest and concern that requires
appropriate action by the Legislature to prevent its spread and to lighten its burden
which now so often falls with crushing force upon the unemployed worker and his
family... . This objective can be furthered by [unemployment insurance
programs], thus maintaining purchasing power and limiting the serious social
consequences of unemployment. . . .
U.C.A. §35A-4-403(l)(c):
[One condition to receiving unemployment benefits is that the Agency must find
that:] [t]he individual is able to work and is available for work during each and
every week with respect to which the individual made a claim for benefits under
this chapter, and acted in good faith in an active effort to secure employment^]
U.C.A. §63-46b-16(4):
The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it
determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced
by any of the following: . . .
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;.. .
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by
the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of
the whole record before the court;
(h) the agency action is: . . .
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the
inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis
for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.

?

Statement of the Case
Petitioner worked for over 10 years before being laid off in April 2002. Prior to
being laid off, Petitioner had taken the LSAT and applied to law schools, intending to
continue working while pursuing a law degree. Petitioner's employment consisted of
software demonstrations, which were done through internet screen sharing technology or
by flying to potential clients' sites; thus, Petitioner was not restrained from moving to
attend law school while continuing his employment. Upon being laid off, Petitioner
initiated work search efforts, and began receiving unemployment benefits. After several
months of searching with only two interviews, Petitioner and his family decided to
continue searching for work while Petitioner attended law school.
Petitioner's unemployment benefits were discontinued when law school began, but
were reinstated following an October 15, 2002 decision by Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) Mellor. The ALJ determined that Petitioner was primarily a worker, and
secondarily a student. Petitioner's unemployment benefits were discontinued again when
the second semester of law school began. Following a hearing, ALJ Vincent issued a
decision on March 20, 2003 affirming denial of benefits. Petitioner appealed to the
Workforce Appeals Board, which affirmed the denial of benefits.
Nature of the Case
Petitioner seeks unemployment benefits that were denied in January 2003.
Petitioner asserts that while in the first year of law school, he continued to seek
employment and would have dropped out of school for suitable work. The Department
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of Workforce Services (DWS) Board of Appeals (Board) found that Petitioner is not
"able and available" as required by Utah statutes, and denied unemployment benefits.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below
Petitioner was denied benefits in September 2002 due to school attendance.
Petitioner appealed and a formal hearing was held in October 2002. In that hearing, ALJ
Mellor found that the Petitioner was primarily a member of the labor market, and
reinstated the benefits.
The DWS again denied benefits in January 2003 due to school attendance.
Petitioner appealed, and a formal hearing was held in March 2003. Based on this
hearing, ALJ Vincent found that the Petitioner's announced willingness to leave school
was not credible, and therefore Petitioner was not "able and available."
Petitioner appealed the decision of the March 2003 hearing to the Board. The
Board determined that as a student the Petitioner could not perform an adequate work
search, and concluded that the Petitioner was not "able and available." Petitioner's
request for reconsideration was denied.
Petitioner now appeals the denial of benefits to the Utah Court of Appeals.
Statement of Facts
Petitioner is 36-years old with a wife and two children. Petitioner received an
undergraduate degree in psychology, but had worked for 10 years for a publisher, mostly
in the Information Technology (IT) field. (R. 13-14.) Petitioner was promoted to the
Director of IT position, managing a large Macintosh computer network, for the last five
years while employed with the publisher. (R. 13.) In June 2002 Petitioner accepted a
4

position with Homestore.com as a pre-sales engineer. (R. 12.) Petitioner's compensation
at that time was approximately $73,000 annually. (R. 62.)
From June 2002 to November 2002 Petitioner traveled extensively for
Homestore.com. (R. 12.) Around November 2002 the workload shifted and Petitioner
began doing more of his work via the internet, which required substantially fewer hours
to perform the work. (R. 13.) Petitioner began preparations for applying to law schools
in January 2002 and subsequently applied to local schools. (R. 14.) If accepted into a
program, Petitioner planned to remain employed while attending school. (R. 16.)
While waiting for responses from schools, Petitioner was laid-off. (R. 14-15.)
Petitioner began searching for work in areas where he had significant experience,
initiated a claim for unemployment benefits, and made a handful of additional
applications to schools outside the local area. (R. 15-16.) After searching for work for
approximately five months, Petitioner had received only two interviews, neither of which
resulted in an offer of employment. (R. 12, 16-17.)
Petitioner felt that training in another area afforded the greatest opportunity for
future employment and accepted an invitation for law school, but continued to search for
work in the IT industry. (R. 18.) In August 2002, Petitioner moved to Spokane to attend
Gonzaga University. Id. Petitioner continued searching for work, of which
approximately 100 contacts are documented during the first semester of school. (R. 3843.) During that time, Petitioner was denied benefits based on his school attendance,
though ALJ Mellor later reinstated benefits on appeal in October 2002. (R. 62-65.)
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Petitioner continued to look for work and meet the other requirements for eligibility for
unemployment benefits throughout 2002.
The DWS again denied benefits when the second semester of school began in
January 2003. (R. 3.) Petitioner continued to search for work, which now included work
in the field for which he was attending school, and began the appeal process anew.
Petitioner's documented work search resulted in a substantially similar number of work
contacts. (R. 18-19, 38-43.) In April 2003 Petitioner was offered and accepted a fulltime summer position. (R. 39.) Despite receiving an offer, Petitioner continued to search
for permanent work in the IT industry. (R. 38-43.)
A formal hearing was conducted in March 2003 by ALJ Vincent regarding the
denial of benefits due to school attendance during the second semester. (R. 1-30.) ALJ
Vincent concluded that Petitioner was not "able and available." (R. 29-30.) The
conclusion was based on the ALJ's belief that Petitioner would not leave school for work.
(R. 29.) On further appeal, the Board affirmed the ALJ's decision. (R. 34-36.) Though
the Board adopted the reasoning and conclusions of the ALJ, the Board did not address
whether the Petitioner would leave school for work. Instead, the Board addresses the
adequacy of Petitioner's work search, concluding that Petitioner has not mounted a
sufficient search for work and is thereby not available as required. Id. The Board denied
Petitioner's request for reconsideration. (R. 45-46.)

6

Summary of the Argument
Petitioner's primary contention is that the facts demonstrate Petitioner's "able and
available" for work status. Petitioner's continued work search evidenced his attachment
to the workforce, even after accepting a summer position. Petitioner also asserts that he
would have left school for appropriate full-time work, which is reasonably evidenced by
the financial considerations as well as Petitioner's need to provide for his family. The
Board should be reversed because the findings and conclusions are against the substantial
evidence in the record, unreasonable in light of the facts and circumstances, against the
public policy, and insufficient as a matter of law. Furthermore, under the facts of this
case, the denial is contrary to previous decisions made by the DWS, and the Board failed
to justify the inconsistency.
Argument
1. The Board's decision should be reversed because the Board erred when it
concluded that the Petitioner had not performed an adequate work search, since the
adequacy of Petitioner's work search is established in the record.
The Board's decision to affirm denial of benefits based on inadequate work search
should be reversed because the evidence in the record establishes the sufficiency of
Petitioner's search efforts. The affirmation denying benefits was based on the "able and
available" clause of U.C.A. § 35A-4-403(l)(c). (R. 3.)
The elements required by this clause are: (1) be able to work, (2) be available for
work, and (3) make an adequate work search. Id. Throughout two formal hearings, very
little, if any, effort was directed at the adequacy of Petitioner's work search. In fact, the

considerations in both of the formal hearing environments were always directed at
whether school attendance interfered with Petitioner's availability for work. (R. 27, 62.)
Though "able and available" is commonly used throughout the record, the question has
always focused on availability, rather than the "able" or "work search" requirements
established by the same statute.
Nothing in the initial denial (R. 3.) or formal hearings (R. 1-30, 62-65.) indicates
that the Petitioner's work search efforts were more than briefly examined. Even so, the
record establishes the adequacy of Petitioner's work search. Of the record, only pages
18, 19, 28 and 63 discuss work search. In the transcript Petitioner indicates that "several'
contacts were made per week (with the exception of the first week of school, which was
not paid, and not appealed). (R. 18 at lines 20-23.) Petitioner further characterized his
work search as having "applied to probably hundreds of jobs" through directed research
in online databases for IT positions. (R. 19 at lines 3-6, 32-33.) Despite this clear
reference to substantial applications for work, the ALJ, presumably relying on the
ambiguous term "several" found that Petitioner had only made two or three job contacts
per week. (R. 28.) Noting that documentation did not exist for all work contacts, the
documented work contacts reveal an average of six contacts per week. (R. 38.) This
assertion is supported by the record. (R. 40-43.) The record also reflects that Petitioner
was only required to make two work contacts per week. (R. 63.)
In Denby v. Industrial Comm 'n, the Supreme Court of Utah discussed how efforts
to become employed touched the availability requirement:
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To be available for work, an applicant must be genuinely
attached to the labor market. The test suggested is subjective
in nature. Whether or not a claimant is in fact available for
work depends to a great extent upon his mental attitude, i.e.
whether he wants to go to work or is content to remain idle.
Indicative of such mental attitude is evidence as to efforts
which the person has made in his own behalf to obtain work.
A person who is genuinely attached to the labor market and
desires employment will make a reasonable attempt to find
work, and will not wait for a job to seek him o u t . . .
Denby v. Industrial Comm 'n, 567 P.2d 626, 628 (Utah, 1977) (quoting Texas
Employment Commission v. Holberg, Tex., 440 S.W.2d 38, 40-41 (Texas, 1969)).
Petitioner's activity in school, combined with his work search efforts, is evidence that he
was not content to remain idle and unemployed; furthermore Petitioner continued to
make reasonable searches for work while attending school. (R. 40-43.) Though the test
is subjective, it is bounded by reason. The record reflects that Petitioner made work
inquiries approximately three times more than was required. (R. 40-43, 63), see also
U.A.C. R994-403-118c(2) (2003) (requiring a minimum of two contacts per week). It is
well within reason that such efforts indicated a lack of idleness, as well as evidenced a
genuine search for work. Other cases have also examined the reasonable requirement in
attempting to find work, and provided for an award of benefits where reasonable efforts
to find work could be found in the record. Gocke v. Wiesley, 420 P.2d 44 (Utah, 1966),
Granite School Dist v. Berry, 606 P.2d 1209 (Utah, 1980).
The Board's conclusion that Petitioner did not make an adequate work search
appears to be based on ALJ Vincent's erroneous finding that Petitioner only made two or
three contacts per week. The Board does not address the facts in the record which
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establish Petitioner's average of six contacts per week. (R. 40-43.) This failure suggests
that as a matter of law the record is insufficient to support the conclusions of the Board.
The Board may have concluded that Petitioner was unable to make an adequate
work search because he was a student (i.e. concluding that first year law students cannot
possibly make an adequate work search). This reasoning appears to be supported by the
fact that the law school restricted work to 19 hours per week. However, the Board fails
to establish how such a restriction might impact a job search which only requires two
contacts per week. The evidence in the record does not reveal what a reasonable work
search might have entailed, thus is not axiomatic that a restriction on work would per se
affect Petitioner's work search efforts to the extent that Petitioner could be said to be
passively searching for work. See Gocke, 420 P.2d at 46. Furthermore, Petitioner's
personal choice of action is described by the Board as reasonable. (R. 35.)
The record does not contain enough information for the Board to conclude that
Petitioner's work search was inadequate. In fact, the record establishes that Petitioner's
work search far exceeded the two contacts per week that the DWS indicated was
required, indicating that Petitioner went well beyond what could be described as
reasonable expectations. The record establishes that the findings (two to three contacts
per week) of the ALJ are incorrect. The record contains substantial evidence indicating
that Petitioner met the work search requirements he was told to meet. Therefore, the
Board's conclusion that the Petitioner did not perform an adequate work search is not
supported by substantial evidence and the Board should be reversed.
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2. The ALJ's conclusion that Petitioner would not leave school to return to full-time
work is arbitrary and capricious because it is not reasonable in light of the
Petitioner's financial considerations and family needs.
ALJ Vincent concluded that Petitioner was not credible in stating that he would
drop out of school for work. (R. 29.) The factors used to support this conclusion were:
(1) rental of the Utah home, (2) moving to Washington, (3) near completion of two
semesters of law school, and (4) student loan obligations. Id. The Board adopted the
reasoning and conclusions of law of the ALJ. (R. 35.) Petitioner asserts that this
conclusion is unreasonable under the conditions presented as justification, and thus
arbitrary and capricious. The Board failed to address the evidence presented at pages 3132 of the record, which establish the reasonableness of the decisions Petitioner made and
which controvert the conclusion that Petitioner would not leave school for work. As
noted in ALJ Mellor's decision, Petitioner has adequate reasons for leaving law school
for work, including supporting a family and solidifying career options (rather than
starting an entirely new career). (R. 65.)
Petitioner was unable after several months to find suitable work in the area where
Petitioner lived. (R. 12.) Petitioner had also been denied acceptance to schools in the
same area, though he had been accepted to other schools. (R. 16-17.) Since Petitioner
was unemployed he was unlikely to qualify for another mortgage, thus selling the Utah
home would have resulted in losing the family homestead. (R. 31.) If Petitioner had to
move, he desired to return to Utah when such possibility presented itself. Id.
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Since the ALJ did not sufficiently explain how renting the Utah home supports the
lack of credibility in Petitioner's willingness to leave school, it is difficult for Petitioner
to marshal arguments supporting the ALJ's position. Petitioner asserts that it is
unreasonable to claim that a person is not available for work because he rented his house
without further explanation to justify such a conclusion. See Adams v. Board of Review
of Indus. Com 'n, 821 P.2d 1 (Utah Ct App. 1991) (failure of agency to make adequate
findings supporting a conclusion can result in resolution of issue in petitioner's favor).
Petitioner has established supra that school in Utah was not an available option.
Petitioner's dilemma was to continue searching for work in an area where five months of
searching had only yielded two interviews, or leave Utah to attend school while
continuing the search for work. The Board admitted that Petitioner's choice of action was
reasonable. (R. 34-35.) Petitioner recognizes that moving is a substantial decision.
However, nothing in the record suggests that the move to Washington was permanent. In
fact, renting the home in Utah implies that moving back was a possibility. Furthermore,
having a "home base" in Washington and Utah increased the area of Petitioner's "locale"
in which he could search for work (and in so doing, reduce the likelihood of
discrimination employers may have to out-of-area applicants). Thus, even in the best
circumstances (from the ALJs perspective) consideration of the move is equivocal.
The ALJ also indicated that completion of the first year of law school provided
some type of milestone after which a student would not leave school for work. The ALJ
reasoned that because the first year is the hardest year (without support in the record for
such allegation), and that Petitioner had nearly completed that year, Petitioner was
12

unlikely to abandon that pursuit. This conclusion may be reasonable if facts and
circumstances justify the conclusion. However, the record lacks details of facts and
circumstances to suggest that such a conclusion would be reasonable. Contrariwise, the
record does contain several references to the Petitioner's need to provide for his family,
indicating that dropping from school would be a reasonable action.
The ALJ and the Board fail to consider the extreme burdens placed on Petitioner
and his family while Petitioner attended school. Petitioner began the pursuit of law
school while employed. (R. 62.) The employment provided insurance, security, and
enough resources for Petitioner to consider additional education while continuing with
his employment. After being laid-off and unsuccessfully searching for work, Petitioner
lost the insurance, security, and resources to sufficiently provide for his family. With no
prospect for work, Petitioner made efforts to improve his employability by seeking
additional education. Petitioner asserts that factual detail is lacking to support the
allegation that school is more important than providing for Petitioner's family's needs,
noting that several reverences in the record indicate Petitioner's desire to provide for his
family. (R. 15, 17, 23, 31-32, 63, 65.) Petitioner asserts that the importance of providing
for his family was not a point of detail in the hearing, yet it appears often.
Petitioner believes that the evidence is sufficient to reasonably establish that
providing for his family's needs today must take precedence over pursuing additional
education opportunities. Petitioner also believes that a conclusion based apparently on
the ALJ's personal experiences, which lack support in the record, is unreasonable based
upon the facts and circumstances established in the record. Attending law school was not
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a long-time goal of Petitioner. (R. 6, 63.) Going to law school began as a pursuit for
keeping Petitioner's mind active, since his work was not challenging. (R. 6.)
Finally, the ALJ notes the student loan incurred to pay the expenses of Petitioner's
first year of law school. The analysis is not reasonable based upon the Petitioner's
position found in the record. Petitioner was earning approximately $73,000 per year
while employed which provided excess funds to accommodate schooling. (R. 62.) The
record does not reflect that Petitioner had substantial savings to pay for law school. It is
reasonable to expect that an unemployed student would take loans to provide for his
tuition and family needs during his schooling.
Petitioner also asserts that such financial consideration is short sighted, and
therefore, unreasonable on its face. If Petitioner completed law school he would incur
over $55,000 in student loan debt. (R. 31-32.) After incurring such debt, Petitioner
would be faced with the possibility that if he didn't pass the exam, his whole education
might be considered a waste. Id. Furthermore, and most indicative of the short
sightedness of the ALJ's conclusion, after passing the bar exam Petitioner would be in
substantially the same position he is in today, that is, he would still be looking for work!
Id. This is strong logical evidence that consideration of the student loan debt as a factor
for remaining in school is inappropriate.
One final consideration with respect to finances is the potential for tuition refund.
By leaving school early in the semester for work, the loan amount would have been
reduced to some degree (based on tuition refunds, and no need of loan money to pay
housing and other daily expenses otherwise necessary while attending school). This
14

would at least imply, using the ALPs reasoning, that earlier in the semester Petitioner
would have been more likely to leave school for work, at least as far as loan amounts are
considered. The argument offered here is that even accepting the AUHs reasoning with
respect to financial considerations, Petitioner would have been more likely to leave early
in the semester, and thus, some unemployment benefits might be payable. The ALJ's
approach either affirms or denies benefits for the whole semester, without considering the
changing financial considerations that occur throughout the semester.
The ALJ (and Board) might argue that Petitioner is in a position to earn more
money after graduating from law school, passing the bar exam, and finding work in the
legal field. The average entry wage for attorneys is less than the wage Petitioner
historically earned. (R. at 62), salary information available through DWS website at
http://jobs.utah.gov/wi/pubs/WnI/UOW/provoorem.pdf, available on November 1, 2003.
Thus, Petitioner would incur substantial debt by continuing school for the possibility of
earning less than Petitioner historically earned. Even if Petitioner might earn more
money in the future, those earnings must be offset by the student loans incurred during
law school. In addition, provision for lost 401(k) funds, and lost earnings while attending
law school should also be factored into the decision. Finally, Petitioner re-asserts that the
needs of his family today outweigh the potential increased future earnings when balanced
against the drawbacks of substantially greater debt, the possibility of not passing the bar,
and the continuing issue of finding permanent work.
Petitioner agrees that the loans acquired to date will have to be repaid. Petitioner
also agrees that in so far as those funds were used to pay tuition, by dropping out of
15

school those funds would appear to be wasted. Petitioner counters that even if he left
school, the education does have substantial residual value. Furthermore, a significant
amount of the loans provided for the financial needs of the family — something that still
would have been required had Petitioner not been in school. These are exactly the family
financial needs unemployment benefits are intended to address as stated in the declared
policy. U.C.A. § 35A-4-102, also discussed infra. Petitioner asserts that family financial
needs would have only been met through loans or other government assistance (the
unemployment benefits in question here did not provide for all needs). Thus, the actual
potential for "loss" attributable to schooling alone is substantially less than the total
amount of the loan.
In conclusion, the justifications used by the ALJ to conclude that Petitioner would
not leave school are not reasonable based on the facts and circumstances for sustaining
such a conclusion.
3. The Board's denial of benefits is inconsistent with the purpose and policy of the
Employment Security Act to provide for the worker "and his family."
The Employment Security Act contains the legislature's stated policy:
"Unemployment. . . requires appropriate action . . . to prevent its spread and to lighten its
burden . . . upon the unemployed worker and his family.'" U.C.A. § 35A-4-102 (2003)
(emphasis added); see also U.A.C. R994-102-101 (2003) (providing for liberal
construction and administration of the Employment Security Act). Petitioner's family
has suffered significant hardships as a result of Petitioner's loss of employment,
hardships that are intended to be mitigated through unemployment benefits.
16

Petitioner intended to go to law school while employed, but after losing his job
and unsuccessfully searching for work for several months, he determined that education
was the best option to provide for his family. Petitioner's area of expertise (the IT
industry) has been hit especially hard in the past several years of economic downturn.
Petitioner agrees that limits for unemployment benefits should be placed on
students, but suggests that such benefits should be based on a totality of circumstances,
rather than the considerations required by U.A.C. R994-403-117c(10)(a). The rule
provides that a student's announced willingness to change school status for work "must
be weighed against the time already spent in school as well as the financial loss the
claimant may incur if he were to withdraw." Id. Perhaps the rule should also include
consideration for availability for work, measured by work search efforts. Petitioner
contends that such a requirement would yield a better result for determining those who
are primarily attached to the workforce, a fundamental requirement for receiving
unemployment benefits.
Regardless of what the rule could contain, the decision to deny benefits in this
case is against the legislature's stated policy of providing for families. The rule which
would deny benefits nearly categorically to students willing to leave school for work fails
to consider sufficiently reasons and rationale for why one who wishes to be employed is,
instead, being educated. The two considerations, (1) time spent in school and (2)
financial loss, fail to consider the effect of unemployment on a family. Presumably this
is due to students generally being younger and single or married without children. Such a

17

wooden rule violates the policy established by the legislature, and, in this case, goes
beyond the bounds of reasonableness and rationality.
Furthermore, in this case, the two factors to be considered do not establish the
reasonableness of the Board's conclusion. The financial consideration has been
discussed supra. Of particular note here, it is the status of student that has allowed
Petitioner to take loans with which he has been able to provide for his family.
Petitioner concedes that some tuition would have been non-refundable, and that
there would have been some financial loss to be considered. However, as indicated
above, the financial loss is potentially much higher by remaining in school. Even so,
Petitioner is still no better off, since he would still be searching for work. Petitioner
maintains that the rule fails to balance the costs of continuing against the costs already
committed, and is therefore unreasonable on its face. By only considering the financial
loss an incomplete picture is used to evaluate whether a student with an announced
willingness to leave school would in fact leave school for work.
The time spent in school requirement should favor Petitioner in this instance.
Petitioner's course of education requires three years of full time study to graduate. In
Petitioner's case, his right to benefits expires before he completes his first year of school.
Thus, Petitioner has not even completed one-third of the schooling required when
benefits expire. Since the consideration for the court is whether the denial exceeds the
bounds of reasonableness and rationality, Petitioner believes that the facts and
circumstances must be considered in each case, rather than determining an arbitrary point
of progression where any student would decide to complete the education or drop out for
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work. It is reasonable and rational that a student without dependents would commit to
completing school earlier in the process, perhaps after completing one-quarter to onethird of the total schooling required. However, it is not reasonable to impose those same
guidelines on a student who has traditionally worked, has already completed an
undergraduate degree, who intends to go to school while working, and who supports
several dependants. Thus, it is not reasonable for the Board to conclude that an
unexpectedly unemployed father supporting a wife and two children would choose to
continue in school after completing less than one-third of the graduation requirements
when work was available with which he could support those dependants.
Petitioner also understands the reasonable barriers in place to prevent the
unemployment system from supplementing students. Petitioner asserts that the
unemployment benefits sought do not supplement school in this case. Petitioner attended
the school that awarded him the highest scholarship he was offered to minimize tuition
costs. Petitioner took student loans to pay tuition and other educational expenses.
However, the economic reality of not receiving unemployment benefits is that
Petitioner's student loans are used for family needs as well (thus increasing the
indebtedness and inappropriately providing support for the ALJ's financial considerations
discussed supra). In fact, Petitioner's^mzTy is struggling with the lack of purchasing
power and other social consequences resulting from the loss of income, items specifically
targeted by the stated policy of the Employment Security Act.
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4. The DWS allowed benefits under nearly identical circumstances and failed to
justify the inconsistency as required by U.C.A. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii).
Petitioner's unemployment benefits were denied under the same "able and
available" requirement at the start of the 2002 Fall Semester due to his school attendance.
(R. 62-65.) U.C.A. § 35A-1-302(1) provides: "An order entered by an administrative law
judge under this title is the final decision of the department unless a further appeal is
initiated[.]" Since the DWS did not appeal the decision in that case, it became the final
decision of the department. U.C.A. § 63-46b-16(4) (h)(iii) provides for relief where the
agency action is "contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the
inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the
inconsistency^]"
Evidence of Petitioner's prior case exists in the record. (R. 5, 62-65.) The DWS
should not be allowed to violate the provisions of the Utah Administrative Procedures
Act which requires the Agency to justify the inconsistency. Since the ALJ and the Board
were aware of the prior decision, and assert no distinguishing reasons for coming to a
different conclusion, the Board has failed to justify in fair and rational terms why the
inconsistency exists.
The Board's best argument would detail differences between the October 2002
hearing and the March 2003 hearing, since the Board accepted the October 2002 decision
by ALJ Mellor. In that time period, Petitioner completed a few months of classes and
increased the school loan debts. Both of those differences are discussed supra. Though
Petitioner had nearly completed his first year of law school, there was still substantial
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schooling left. In addition, Petitioner's finances would have improved substantially
sooner had he been able to find work and drop out of school. These differences between
hearings are minimal compared to the big picture (i.e. a three year school commitment,
costing over $55,000). The minor changes do not adequately justify the Board's
inconsistent position.
Conclusion
For the reasons herein stated, Petitioner urges the court to reverse the decision of
the Board in this case. First, the conclusion of the Board the Petitioner did not make an
adequate work search is refuted by the evidence in the record. Second, the weight of the
evidence establishes the reasonableness of Petitioner's actions, making the decision of the
DWS arbitrary and capricious. Third, the decision is contrary to the policy established by
the legislature which provides that unemployment benefits are not only for the
unemployed, but also to support the family of the unemployed. Finally, the DWS failed
to justify the mccpnsistency between decisions as required by Utah statute.

Paul Hammer, Petitioner
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